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Abstract—Access control is a key challenge in software 
engineering, especially in relational database applications. 
Current access control techniques are based on additional 
security layers designed by security experts. These additional 
security layers do not take into account the necessary business 
logic leading to a separation between business tiers and access 
control mechanisms. Moreover, business tiers are built from 
commercial tools (ex: Hibernate, JDBC, ODBC, LINQ), which 
are not tailored to deal with security aspects. To overcome this 
situation several proposals have been presented. In spite of 
their relevance, they do not support the enforcement of access 
control policies at the level of the runtime values that are used 
to interact with protected data. Runtime values are critical 
entities because they play a key role in the process of defining 
which data is accessed. In this paper, we present a general 
technique for static checking, at the business tier level, the 
runtime values that are used to interact with databases and in 
accordance with the established access control policies. The 
technique is applicable to CRUD (create, read, update and 
delete) expressions and also to actions (update and insert) that 
are executed on data retrieved by Select expressions. A proof of 
concept is also presented. It uses an access control platform 
previously developed, which lacks the key issue of this paper. 
The collected results show that the presented approach is an 
effective solution to enforce access control policies at the level 
of runtime values that are used to interact with data residing in 
relational databases. 
Keywords-security; access control; database, business tiers; 
software architecture. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sensitive data is growing every day as an immediate 
consequence of the increasing usage of software systems. 
The data is related not only to personal information, as it 
happens for example in social networks, but it is also related 
to other important and critical areas such as commercial, 
institutional and security organizations. To prevent any 
security violation, several security measures are taken such 
as user authentication, data encryption and secure 
connections. Another relevant security concern is access 
control. There are two main approaches to enforce access 
control policies: the one provided by vendors of database 
management systems and XACML [1] (eXtensible Access 
Control Markup Language). Both approaches rely on 
additional security layers built by security experts leading to 
a clear separation between the security mechanisms and 
business tiers. Moreover, current commercial tools that are 
used to develop business tiers do not support access control 
policies, this way hampering the process of bridging the gap 
between access control mechanisms and business tiers built 
from those tools. To overcome this situation, several access 
control techniques have been proposed [2-13] but none of 
them effectively models the values that are defined at 
runtime. The runtime values are critical because they are 
dynamically defined by users at runtime, this way enabling 
users to request the access to different data in each execution 
cycle. We present three examples to justify our claims. The 
first one is based on a native Select expression, the second 
one is based on a native Update expression and, finally, the 
third one is based on modifying the contents of a record set 
containing data retrieved by a Select expression (in these 
cases the modifications are also committed to the host 
database). The following example is a simple Select 
expression. 
Select t1.* from table1 t1, table2 t2 
      where t1.id = t2.t1_id and 
            t1.value > pValue 
 
The parameter (runtime value) pValue plays a key role to 
decide which data are retrieved from table1. In each 
individual execution cycle, the parameter may have a 
different value, this way retrieving a different set of records 
from table1. To overcome this source of possible security 
gaps, two approaches are used to implement the access 
control mechanisms: centralized approach and distributed 
approach. Regarding the centralized approach, the most 
common technique is the use of views (with [10] or without 
query rewriting techniques). This technique conveys several 
drawbacks among which the lack of scalability is 
emphasized [14, 15]. Regarding the distributed approach, 
two techniques were proposed: in [4] is proposed a new 
predicate, identified as known, to model which information 
users already know, this way covering the points here under 
discussion but only superficially; in [2] the policies are 
statically enforced at the table columns level and not at the 
CRUD (Create, Read, Update and Delete) expressions level, 
leading to lack of flexibility. 
The following example is the second example, which is a 
simple Update expression: 
 Update table1 t1 set t1.value=pValue 
  Where t1.id=pId 
2Similar to the Select expression, this Update expression also 
uses parameters. The parameter pValue updates the attribute 
value of table1 of a record identified by another parameter 
pId. Once again, parameters are user defined and play a key 
role on Update expressions to decide the data to be updated. 
The current techniques and their limitations, previously 
described for Select expressions, are also applied to Update 
expressions. The remaining types of CRUD expressions, 
Insert and Delete, convey similar limitations. 
The last example is a very common situation on current 
tools that are used to develop business tiers, such as JDBC 
[16], Hibernate [17], ADO.NET [18] and LINQ [19]. The 
example shows that beyond the use of CRUD expressions, 
databases are also modifiable by executing protocols on data 
retrieved by Select expressions. The example shows that 
after retrieving data from a database, it is kept in record sets 
(recordSet) and then applications are allowed to update their 
content through an update protocol. In this case the attribute 
attributeName was updated to value and then the 
modification was committed. This case is different from the 
two previous ones because there is no evidence of any 
CRUD expression and users are modifying data they have 
been previously authorized to retrieve. Even so, we cannot 
despise the need to control the runtime values being used to 
modify the contents of those record sets and, therefore, used 
to modify the contents of databases. Beyond the update 
protocol, current tools also provide an insert protocol where 
users are also allowed to use runtime values. 
recordSet=executeSelectExpression(sql) 
recordSet.update(“attributeName”, value) 
recordsSet.commit() 
 
Currently, there isn´t any known access control technique 
to enforce policies at the business tier level and able to 
statically control the provenance of runtime values that are 
used on actions issued against databases. To overcome this 
situation we propose a technique where parameters are 
statically driven by access control policies enforced at the 
business tier level. Additionally, we present a proof of 
concept to validate the proposed technique. The proof of 
concept leverages an existent and internal access control 
platform, partially based on [13]. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the 
related work. Section III presents the required background to 
keep the paper self-contained. Section IV describes the 
conceptual architecture and, finally, section V presents the 
final conclusion. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Views have been widely used to restrict the access to 
protected data. In spite of their relevance, the use of views to 
implement access control conveys a key drawback: lack of 
scalability [14, 15]. Basically the number of views increases 
with the number of policies. Access control based on views 
is easily managed in database applications with a short 
number of policies. But access control in database 
applications with a large number of policies may become 
unmanageable as in cases where they depend, for example, 
on data stored on databases. Moreover, the problem is not 
restricted to the level of views. Users accessing the same 
table but with different authorization levels use different 
views and, therefore, different CRUD expressions. In order 
to minimize this scalability gap, Rizvi et al. [10] present a 
query rewriting technique to determine at runtime if a CRUD 
expression is authorized, without the need of creating 
different versions of views. It uses security views to filter 
contents of tables and simultaneously to infer and check at 
runtime the appropriate authorization to execute any CRUD 
expression issued against the unfiltered table. The user is 
responsible for formulating the CRUD expression properly. 
They call this approach the Non-Truman model. Non-
Truman models, unlike Truman models, do not change the 
original CRUD expressions. The process is transparent for 
users, and CRUD expressions are rejected if they do not have 
the appropriate authorization. This approach has some 
disadvantages: 1) performance - the inference rules to check 
the appropriate authorization at runtime are complex and 
time consuming; 2) productivity - authorizations are checked 
against security views and not against original data in a 
transparent way, hampering the debugging process when any 
syntax error or security violation occurs; 3) awareness - 
programmers cannot statically check the correctness of 
CRUD expressions because the policies and the mechanisms 
are centralized in a server; 4) incompleteness - the inference 
rules are complex and their completeness is not assured by 
the authors. 
In [4], Chlipala et al. present a tool, Ur/Web, that allows 
programmers to write statically-checkable access control 
policies as CRUD expressions. Basically, each policy 
determines which data is accessible. Then, programs are 
written and checked to assure that data involved in queries is 
accessible through some policy. To allow policies to vary 
from one user to another, their CRUD expressions use actual 
data and a new extension to the standard SQL to capture 
‘which secrets the user knows’. This extension is based on a 
predicate referred to as ´known’ used to model which 
information users are already aware of to decide upon the 
information to be disclosed. Ur/Web is a promising solution, 
but beyond introducing a new programming technique, it 
presents two key drawbacks: 1) it does not check the use of 
runtime values of where clauses, allowing queries to 
implicitly leak protected data; 2) authors say that their 
implementation “…only handles a subset of the common 
SQL features.”. 
Caires et al. [2] introduces a new programming language, 
name as λ, to define and enforce access control policies by 
static typing. The security model comprises tables, their 
attributes and the access control policies associated to each 
attribute. Authors show that runtime values are checked 
against the policies before being used. Beyond introducing a 
new programming language, policies are enforced at the 
attribute level of tables, this way hindering or even 
preventing the use of multiple policies on each attribute. 
The paper [13] presents an access control-driven 
architecture with dynamic adaptation (ACADA). Business 
tiers are automatically built from a business architectural 
model, enforcing access control policies defined by a 
security expert. Access control mechanisms are statically 
3implemented by typed objects driven by security policies at 
the business tier level. ACADA effectively controls which 
CRUD expressions are authorized to be used but does not 
control the runtime values being used.  
III. BACKGROUND 
To ease the development process of business tiers, 
system architects use tools specially designed to that end. 
Two main groups of tools are considered: Call Level 
Interfaces (CLI) [20] and Object-to-Relational Mapping 
(O/RM) tools. ODBC [21], JDBC [16] and ADO.NET [22] 
are three examples of CLI and Hibernate [17], LINQ [23] 
and JPA [24] are three examples of O/RM tools. These tools 
provide services to allow applications to interact with 
databases. These services need to be understood before 
advancing to any security solution implemented at the 
business tier level. In spite of the diversity of tools and the 
difference between the paradigms of the two groups, there is 
a common basis between them. This is very important to 
promote the use of a single technique in all tools and mainly 
on both groups. The common basis is centered on their two 
main access modes to stored data: direct access mode and the 
indirect access mode. The direct access mode allows the 
execution of CRUD expressions written in the native SQL 
language and the indirect access mode allows applications to 
interact with data returned by Select expressions. While the 
direct access mode is widely used and easily understood, the 
indirect access mode needs a more detailed explanation. 
When a Select expression is executed, it returns a relation 
containing the retrieved data. These relations are locally 
managed by local memory structures (LMS). There are four 
protocols to interact with the data managed by LMS: read 
protocol (to read data from LMS), update protocol (to update 
data contained in LMS), insert protocol (to insert new data in 
LMS) and delete protocol (to delete data contained in LMS). 
Any modification on the contents of LMS is replicated on the 
host database. Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict a simple example 
based on JDBC and LINQ, respectively. The method 
updateStudentMobilePhone updates numbers of mobile 
phones of every student whose id is contained in the first 
argument (sId). The Select expression is built with two 
parameters (line 29-31, 116-118) and executed (line 32, 119-
120) through the direct access mode (rs.executeQuery and 
jpa.ExecuteQuery). Then LMS (rs (ResultSet [25]) for JDBC 
and ord (typed object) for LINQ) are iterated row by row 
(line 33, 121). mobilePhone is updated (line 36-37, 126-127) 
if the student id (rs.getInt and s.id) is contained in the list sId 
(line 34-35, 123-124) through the indirect access mode. This 
update on the LMS is equivalent to the following Update 
expression 
 Update Student s 
  Set s.mobilePhone=mobilePhone 
  Where s.id=sId(idx) 
 
and, therefore, sId and modiblePhone in Figure 1 and Figure 
2 behave as runtime values for the two parameters of the 
equivalent Update expression. From this example it is also 
easily inferred the equivalency between the insert and delete 
protocols    and    the    correspondent    Insert    and    Delete 
 
Figure 1. Example based on JDBC. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example based on LINQ. 
 
expressions. These two  simple   examples  have   shown  the 
usage of the two access modes that are provided by current 
tools and also the usage of runtime  values. Additionally, the 
examples also show that JDBC and LINQ, akin to the 
remaining tools, are not driven by access control policies. 
Their access modes allow programmers to write any CRUD 
expression (using the direct access mode) and also allow the 
use of any protocol on LMS. These latter two issues have 
been addressed in [13]. 
IV. ARCHITECTURE PRESENTATION 
In this section we present an access control technique 
which enforces policies at the business tier level which is 
able to statically control the provenance of runtime values 
that are used on actions issued against databases. The 
technique supervises the runtime values that are used on both 
access modes of current tools that are used for developing 
business tiers. Nevertheless, access control policies can only 
be effectively enforced if other complementary aspects are 
also considered. Among them the authorized CRUD 
expressions and the actions on LMS are emphasized. Those 
aspects are not addressed in this paper because they were 
already addressed in [13]. From [13], a platform has been 
designed and developed. The platform will be used and 
modified to present the proof of concept. This section is 
organized as follows: the sub-section A presents the proposed 
technique; sub-section B briefly presents the used platform; 
4sub-section C presents the proof of concept and, finally, 
subsection D presents a use case. 
A. Proposed Technique 
We start by introducing the concept of Business Access 
Point (BAP). A BAP is an entity responsible for managing 
the runtime values of the two access modes in accordance 
with the established access control policies. Each access 
mode type has its own particular characteristics. As such, 
their conceptual architecture is presented separately. 
Direct Access Mode 
The direct access mode allows the execution of CRUD 
expressions based on the native SQL language. In a general  
context, each CRUD expression comprises a hard coded part 
and eventually one or more parameters of which the values 
are defined at runtime. The values for these parameters are 
not mandatory to be driven by any access control policy. It is 
up to the security expert to decide for each CRUD expression 
which parameters are driven by access control policies and 
which parameters are not driven by any access control 
policy. Thus, the direct access mode (DAM) is formalized by 
the next triplet: 
DAM( RTV, RTVacp, execute) 
where RTV is a set of RunTime Values for parameters not 
driven by any access control policy, RTVacp is a set of 
RunTime Values for the parameters driven by access control 
policies and, finally, execute is a method responsible for 
setting the runtime values for parameters and also for the 
execution of CRUD expressions. As initially announced, 
RTVacp are statically enforced and, therefore, their 
implementation will have this in consideration. Eventually, 
each runtime value may be encapsulated as an interface that 
provides a service aimed at returning values driven by access 
control policies. 
Indirect Access Mode 
The indirect access mode provides four protocols for the 
interaction with the data contained by LMS that is returned 
by native Select expressions. A first solution has been 
proposed to provide the four protocols driven by access 
control policies [13]. Basically, it includes two aspects: 1) 
the availability of each protocol is individually configured 
and 2) each protocol that is made available provides methods 
to access only the attributes that are authorized by the 
established policies.  This approach is not complete because 
it does not support parameters driven access control policies. 
Next follows the proposed approach to overcome this 
security gap. The indirect access mode (IAM) is formalized 
as follows: 
IAM(readP, insertP, updateP, deleteP) 
where readP is the read protocol, insertP is the insert 
protocol, updateP is the update protocol and, finally, deleteP 
is the delete protocol. Only the insert and the update 
protocols use runtime values. The read protocol does not 
modify the contents of LMS and the delete protocol is 
executed as an atomic operation on all attributes of the 
selected row. Thus, each individual method of the insert and 
update protocol that is used to modify each attribute of the 
returned relation (contained in LMS) needs to be configured 
to be or not to be driven by access control policies. They are 
formalized as: 
method(RTV) or method(RTVacp) 
where method is the method’s name, RTV and RTVacp have 
the meaning previously presented for the direct access mode. 
The only difference is that either RTV or RTVacp represent a 
single runtime value. The indirect access mode is only 
available after a Select expression is executed through the 
direct access mode. The remaining CRUD expressions do 
not create LMS. This leads to the need of defining two facets 
for the BAP: one for the Select expressions (BAPs) and 
another for the remaining expressions (BAPiud). BAPiud 
supports the direct access mode only and is formalized as 
follows: 
BAPiud(DAM) 
BAPs supports both modes and is formalized as follows: 
BAPs(DAM,IAM) 
B. Used Platform 
The proof of concept here presented leverages the work 
previously presented in [13]. The work has been used to 
design a new architecture known as DACA (Dynamic 
Access Control Architecture). Figure 3 presents a simplified 
block diagram of DACA. DACA is able to dynamically, at 
runtime, build and keep updated business logic of relational 
database applications in accordance with the established 
access control policies. It comprises 2 main components: a 
client side component for the application and business tiers 
and a server side component where metadata of access 
control mechanisms are kept. The basic operation of DACA 
is as follows (see Figure 3): 1- application tier instantiates a 
Dynamic Access Control Component (DACC); 2- DACC, 
through the Business Manager, establishes a connection with 
the Policy Server; 3- The Policy Server transfers and keeps 
security metadata and CRUD expressions continuously 
updated on DACC, in accordance with the established access 
control policies; 4- DACC, through the Business Manager, 
dynamically builds and keeps business logic updated; 5- 
application tiers ask Business Manager to execute authorized 
CRUD   expressions;  6- Business   Manager   delegates   the 
execution    of   CRUD   expressions   on   the   implemented 
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Figure 3. Simplified block diagram of DACA. 
5Business   Logic;  7- CRUD  expressions   are  executed  (the 
RDBMS server   may   or   may  not be the   same  as   the   
one responsible  for the  Policy  Server). 
C. Proof of Concept 
The initial version of DACA was redesigned to address 
the issues of this research and it is hereafter known as 
RDACA (Redesigned-DACA). We have decided that the 
policy to be followed for RTVacp requires that the values can 
only come from data previously retrieved by authorized 
Select expressions. To address this new security requirement 
the original DACA security access control mechanisms were 
redesigned.  To give a complete view of the implemented 
solution, class diagrams of BAP will be provided. 
The client-side of RDACA was implemented in Java and 
JDBC and, therefore, all examples are based on those tools. 
In the RDACA each RTVacp is defined as an interface 
comprising a unique method which is responsible for 
retrieving the authorized value. The proposed approach, as it 
will be shown, allows a static validation for all RTVacp at 
development time. 
Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 present simplified class 
diagrams for the approach followed for the BAP to enforce 
access control policies. In a first step, one interface is defined 
for each individual RTVacp as shown in Figure 4: IRTV_a, 
IRTV_b, …, IRTV_n. Each interface is related to a unique 
RTVacp and it comprises also one unique method responsible 
for ensuring that the values are effectively authorized. rA, rB, 
…, rN are the defined methods and DT_a, DT_b and DT_n 
are the data types of the RTVacp in the host programming 
language. The concrete implementation of each method 
depends on the adopted security strategy. In case of the 
RDACA, these methods retrieve data from data previously 
retrieved by authorized Select expressions and also managed 
by BAPs. 
Figure 5 presents a simplified class diagram for one 
BAPs. The constructor of the base class, BAPs, receives a 
connection to the database and the CRUD id to be executed. 
Programmers do not write CRUD expressions anymore. 
They are only allowed to select, though the CRUD id, which 
CRUD expression is necessary. In case she is not authorized 
to use the requested CRUD expression, an exception will be 
raised. Other important aspects are the IExecute and the 
ILMS interfaces. IExecute is associated with the direct access 
mode and ILMS is associated with the indirect access mode. 
IExecute comprises one unique method (execute). It accepts 
as arguments RTV and RTVacp for the runtime values of the 
clause conditions for the Select expression to be executed. In 
this particular case, it accepts an RTV of type DT_a and an 
RTVacp of type IRTV_b. Thus, to execute the requested 
Select expression it is necessary to be a holder of an BAPs 
providing an IRTV_b. Regarding the ILMS interface, it 
comprises several interfaces being IRead and IUpdate 
presented with some detail. They are enough to convey a 
complete understanding about the followed approach. IRead 
implements the read protocol on LMS providing all the 
necessary methods to that end. Each method retrieves the 
value of one attribute of the returned relation. There are two 
types of methods: one type retrieves values that can only be 
used as RTV and the other type retrieves values that can be 
used as RTVacp. Methods retrieving RTV are directly defined 
in the IRead interface, such as rB and rC as shown in Figure 
5. Methods retrieving RTVacp are defined by extending IRead 
with the interfaces that provide RTVacp, see Figure 4. The 
shown IRead interface provides two methods for RTV (rB 
and rC) and one interface for one RTVacp (IRTV_a). This 
distinction allows Business Manager (see Figure 3), by 
analyzing the schema, to be able to distinguish between RTV 
from RTVacp and, therefore, to provide, during the automatic 
building process of Business Logics, different 
implementations for the two types of methods. Regarding the 
IUpdate interface it is associated with the update protocol. In 
this particular case it comprises two methods: a) uA updates 
the attribute a and it accepts an RTVacp (IRTV_a); b) uB 
updates the attribute b and it accepts any RTV of type DT_b. 
Figure 6 presents a simplified class diagram for one 
BAPiud. The description for the base class and also for the 
IExecute interface is identical to the previous BAPs. 
Regarding ISet, it comprises one unique method (set), which 
accepts as arguments RTV and RTVacp for the runtime values 
of the column list of the Update  expressions. In t his  case  it 
accepts two RTVacp and one  RTV. Thus,  to  be  able  to  use  
   
...
+rA() : DT_a
«interface»
IRTV_a
+rB() : DT_b
«interface»
IRTV_b
+rN() : DT_n
«interface»
IRTV_n
 
Figure 4. Set of RTVacp. 
 
+uA(in value : IRTV_a)
+uB(in value : DT_b)
«interface»
IUpdate
+execute(in a : DT_a, in b : IRTV_b)
«interface»
IExecute
«interface»
IBAPs
+BAPs(in conn : Connection, in crud : uint)
BAPs
«interface»
ILMS
IDelete
IInsert
+rB() : DT_b
+rC() : DT_c
«interface»
IRead
IRTV_a
 
Figure 5. Simplified class diagram for a concrete BAPs. 
 
+BAPr(in conn : Connection, in crud : uint)
BAPiud «interface»
IBAPiud
+execute(in a : IRTV_a, in c : IRTV_c, in d : DT_d)
«interface»
IExecute
+set(in b : IRTV_b, in c : IRTV_c, in d : DT_d)
«interface»
ISet
 
Figure 6. Simplified class diagram for a BAPiud. 
6this BAPiud  it  is  required  to  be  authorized  to  execute  the 
required CRUD expressions and to hold three RTVacp 
(IRTV_a, IRTV_B and IRTV_c) provided by one or more 
BAPs. 
D. Use Case 
We are now prepared to present a real use case 
implemented with Java, JDBC and Microsoft Northwind 
database1. The use case is based on an actor responsible for 
managing orders coming from customers in the USA only. 
The actor is authorized to execute the two following CRUD 
expressions: 
Select * from Customers 
        where customerId=?  // (RTV) 
                  and Country=’USA’ 
Select * from Orders 
             Where CustomerId=? // (RTVacp) 
               and ShipCountry=? // (RTV) 
 
The first Select expression allows the access to 
information about the customers residing in the USA and the 
second Select expression allows the access to orders only 
from customers the user is authorized to know (RTVacp – in 
this case residing in USA) and whose ship county is user 
defined (RTV). The BAPs associated with the latter Select 
expression is updatable and one particularity is that the 
attribute employeeId requires an RTVacp when using the 
indirect access mode. 
To address this case, two BAPs are needed, one for each 
CRUD expression. We have used the table names to identify 
each BAPs, Customers and Orders. From the two Select 
expressions we see that, when using the direct access mode, 
the second one requires an RTVacp for the first parameter - 
CustomerId.  Figure 7 shows an example of how the two 
BAPs (Customers and Orders) may be used. A new instance 
of Customers is created (line 30) and the CRUD expression 
is executed (line 31) to select data about the customer 
identified by the RTV of customerId. Then, the first and only 
row of the LMS (rs) is selected (line 32). Some attributes are 
read (line 33-34).  Then an instance of Orders is created (line 
35) and the CRUD is executed (line 36). The CRUD has two 
parameters, the first one is an RTVacp and the second one is 
an RTV. The RTVacp is for customerId and it is passed as the 
instance of Customers, which implements the required 
interface for the RTVacp. The ship country is an RTV and, 
therefore, it is user defined. Some attributes are read (line 37-
38) and the programmer tries to update employeeId but the 
NetBeans indicates an error because the correct data type 
cannot be an integer (line 39). To update employeeId through 
the indirect access mode the programmer needs an RTVacp of 
the required type. To convey a deeper understanding some 
additional details are provided for the two BAPs. Figure 8 
shows the interface herein named as ICustomerId for the 
RTVacp customerId. This interface is used not only to be 
implemented by BAPs but also used whenever identifications 
of customers need  to be  used  as RTVacp  for  arguments  of 
BAP methods, as shown in Figure 7. The  implementation  of  
                                                          
1 http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=23654 
 
Figure 7. Example to show the use of the two BAPs: Customers and Orders. 
 
 
Figure 8. Interface for the RTVacp to be used for the parameter CustomerId. 
 
this interface should comprise some validation procedures to 
prevent its misuse. As previously explained, 
BusinessManager automatically generates the required 
source code for Business Logic. In this particular case, it 
creates the required source code for rCustomerId() in 
accordance with the established security requirements. 
The IRead interface for Customers is presented in Figure 
9. It provides a set of methods to read the attributes of the 
returned relation. CustomerId is the only attribute with the 
ability to be used as an RTVacp and, therefore, the IRead 
interface extends the ICustomerId interface. 
Figure 10 shows the IExecute interface for the BAPs 
Orders. It comprises two arguments. The first argument is an 
RTVacp for customerId and, therefore, it requires the 
correspondent interface (ICustomerId). The second argument 
is an RTV for the ship country. Figure 11 presents its 
implementation in  which a main  aspect is  emphasized. The 
RTVacp (customerId) is passed as  an  interface  (line 28)  and  
 
 
Figure 9. IRead interface for Customers. 
 
 
Figure 10. IExecute interface for Orders. 
 
 
Figure 11. execute method implementation of Orders. 
7the run time value (line 32) is obtained from the method 
specifically created for the effect and defined in the 
ICustomerId interface. 
There is a runnable demo available at 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/71192544/Work/Confer
s/SEKE/SEKE_2013/Example.7z . 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a technique aimed at enforcing access 
control policies statically at the level of the runtime values 
that are used on business tiers to interact with data stored on 
relational database management systems. The technique is 
applicable to commercial tools geared up to develop business 
tiers, such as JDBC, ODBC, Hibernate and LINQ, and 
supports their two most common access modes: the direct 
and the indirect access mode. Security experts are able to 
decide the policies to be used, which runtime values are 
driven by those policies and which are not. Runtime values 
driven by access control policies are managed at the business 
tier level to ensure the use of authorized values only. The 
presented proof of concept is based on an existent platform 
that has been redesigned to support a new security 
requirement. The new security requirement says that only 
previously retrieved values from the database are allowed to 
be used for the runtime values driven by access control 
policies. The implemented technique is based on interfaces 
comprising a unique method of which the implementation 
ensures the new security requirement. Beyond the presented 
proof of concept a runnable demo is also available. 
It is expected that the outcome of this research will have 
impact on future proposals addressing access control on 
relational databases, mainly when policies are enforced at the 
level of client business tiers. 
As future work, we intend to apply the techniques used in 
[26, 27] to design a thread-safe version of DACC. These 
techniques have proved to be not only simple to implement 
but above all conveying a significant performance 
improvement. 
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